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Abstract
Peace teams work in the trenches of demonstration
in liberal democracies. When situations between
different parties can escalate to violence, they deploy
various tactics and tools to de-escalate the situation.
Their work navigates a web of institutions and actors,
as well as tools that introduce their materiality into
de-escalatory practices. Depicting this system stands to
highlight how Peace Teams an maximize their capacities
both socially and technologically. However, to date
there is no cohesive social and material account of
Peace Team work. This study adopts a sociomaterial
perspective of demonstrations through the eyes of
Peace Teams and their de-escalatory tactics, using
semi-structured interview and focus groups. We provide
theoretical insights about the sociomaterial nature of
de-escalation as being a confluence of social and
material intra-actions, and argue for bases of trust as an
underlying mechanism to account for the configuration
of particular sociomaterial assemblages as manifest in
the protest-repression nexus.
1. Introduction
Following the murder of George Floyd in May
of 2020, Black Lives Matter demonstrations took
place nationwide. Although largely nonviolent, violent
challengers like right-wing counter protesters and police
reprisals invited violence by demonstrators that was
latched onto by the media. This provided a springboard
for opponents of the movement to cast the demonstrators
as rioters and looters in an attempt to sway public
opinion against them [1].
Peace Teams activated during these events as forces
of de-escalation that use a variety of de-escalatory
tactics “to prevent violence and aggression” [2]. In
addition to providing safety for demonstrators, they help
movements maintain nonviolent discipline. By helping
demonstrators remain nonviolent, Peace Teams help
movements build achieve broad support which Stephan
and Chenoweth [3] show is critical to a movement’s
success. Therefore Peace Team work stands to be
extremely valuable in continuing social progress in
liberal democracies that depend on free speech and
freedom of assembly.
Demonstrations today are highly technologized [4]
as virtual and physical spaces converge, driven by the
wide availability of constant connectivity technologies
like cell phones and telecommunications infrastructure
[5]. While information systems (IS) scholarship
largely focuses on digital technologies within social
movements, tools in demonstrations are in fact much
broader, including non-digital tools that interact with
digital ones and social actors. A full understanding
of Peace Teams and de-escalation necessitates a
broad view of the embeddedness of their tactics, as
acting between demonstrators, authorities, digital and
non-digital technologies, and the entanglement of these
entities.
To engage the interconnected nature of the
protest-repression nexus, we adopt the perspective
of sociomaterial assemblages, characterizing it as a
system composed of social and technical entities with
emergent properties [6]. Peace Teams are embroiled
in assemblages that include police, demonstrators
and organizers, counter-protesters, and tools and
technologies. De-escalatory tactics that Peace Teams
use are actions within this system, or ”intra-actions”
insofar as they emerge from the relationships between
social and material actors [6, 7].
Research on Peace Teams and de-escalatory tactics
marks an extension of IS scholarship in two ways.
First, Peace Teams are an understudied but increasingly
important aspect of social movements. Second, it
continues a trend in IS research recently established
by Tarafdar and Kafal Ray [8] towards finer grained
sociomaterial analyses of social movements. Therefore,
we explore what is the shape of the sociomaterial
assemblage that underlies intra-active de-escalation
tactics as deployed by Peace Teams? By doing so,
we produce theoretical insights from de-escalation as





intra-action within this sociomaterial assemblage.
2. Background
2.1. Background on Peace Teams
Although there is vigorous debate as to the efficacy
of nonviolent civil resistance in social movements [9,
10], seminal scholarship by Stephan and Chenoweth [3]
shows that, almost irrespective of context, nonviolent
movements are more effective in achieving long-term
success by gaining broad participation and support.
Organizations like Peace Teams that help maintain
nonviolent discipline and safety are therefore an integral
component of social progress.
Peace Teams operate under a few different labels,
including violence interrupters [11] or unarmed civilian
protection (UCP) teams [12, 13, 14]. Although today
they define the bounds and practices of their volunteer
work in distinct ways as governed by their own
organizational inclinations and local contexts, they trace
their lineage to Mahatma Gandhi’s notion of a ‘Peace
Army,’ or ‘Shanti Sena’ [12]. In Gandhi’s mind,
these unarmed armies would interposition themselves
in conflict between aggressors and their targets.
During escalation, these interruptions can make all the
difference between a peaceful resolution and a violent
one [15].
Extant scholarship on Peace Teams argues for their
efficacy in peacekeeping in comparison to militarized
approaches [16, 17, 13] and the potential to reduce
overall violence in urban centers [18]. Evaluation and
assessment studies provide further support for Peace
Team activity, including empirically supporting their
efficacy in reducing violence [19, 20] and the benefits
of participation, such as job opportunities and improved
future outlook for at-risk team members [19].
Scholars with connections to on-the-ground
experiences of Peace Teams provide organizational
and tactical surveys of their practices, forming the
foundations for empirical research on Peace Teams and
extending argumentative cases. The tactics of both
mitigating state-sponsored violence and violent flanks
within a movement are goals that Peace Teams support,
integrating their own tactics and practices in support of
broader activist movements who are developing their
own tactics of violence management [21]. Schweitzer
[22] and Julian and Schweitzer [12] covered this ground
in identifying Peace Teams worldwide and the various
definitions of unarmed civilian peacekeeping that
lead to different de-escalatory practices. Julian [16]
deepened our understanding by then characterizing
Peace Team practices across three dimensions: a)
deterrence of violence by presence; b) engagement
with armed potential escalators; and c) building
relationships between stakeholders. The connective
logic in this scholarship is that the particular arena of
deployment, be it regional or situational, shapes how
these dimensions manifest in practice. This includes
teams in the global north like the United States [12].
2.2. Peace Teams in the Protest-Repression
Nexus
The racial justice demonstrations of 2020 following
the police murder of George Floyd tested the nonviolent
ideologies and tactics of these Peace Teams. This space
was the United States’ version of the ‘protest-repression
nexus’ [23]. This nexus constitutes a dynamic,
reciprocal interaction between forces, with conventional
thought focusing on protesters and state agents (police,
military) as the primary elements of confrontation.
Here, displays of hostility by opposing sides beget
further hostility [24]. Extant scholarship shows how
different forms of repression impact dissent choices and
can lead to tactical shifts in forms of resistance [25, 26,
3] and affect the likelihood to employ more repression
in the future [27, 28]. On the other hand, scholarship
also shows how forms of resistance can likewise impact
repression choices, such as the choice of guerilla
warfare tactics [29] and, more broadly, the efficacy of
a movement in challenging state authority [23, 3]. The
evolution of understanding in this space now includes
the potential impact of ‘violent flanks’ that introduce
violent tactical choices into social movements [30], as
well as counter-protesters targeting the demonstrators
themselves [31].
Extant scholarship is evolving to fit the current
awareness of the actors in the protest-repression nexus.
However, this also highlights the value of incorporating
understanding of Peace Teams into the relational
dynamics that characterizes this scholarship. As
being potentially valuable to maintaining nonviolent
discipline, their work is directly tied to tactical choice.
Beyond the relationship between social movement
organizations and Peace Team organizations, broader
relational views of Peace Teams focuses on connections
to local context, motivated by the observation that peace
practices are strongly influenced by local conditions
[12]. This backdrops Peace Team work, emphasizing
the development of community connections, and in
particular the essential role of trust in these connections
[11]. It also lends depth to understanding the ideological
backing of peace work in influencing perspectives of
violence that inform practices [32, 33].
Despite the scholarship exploring the connected web
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of social actors to Peace Team organizations, efforts
to explore the tools and their material role in Peace
Team work has not materialized at the same level. This
stands to miss critical insights about Peace Teams and
their tactics in the protest-repression nexus given the
latter’s ostensibly ’hybrid’ existence where the virtual
and the physical exist in a state of overlap [4]. The
closest proximate scholarship is on social movements
(with which Peace Teams engage, but are distinct in
purpose and tactics) [8, 34, 35], but are largely restricted
to digital spaces. The crux of demonstrations being
on-the-ground calls for a broader understanding of tools
within this space as having a material presence in the
practices of social movements, and in turn, Peace Team
organizations.
2.3. Theoretical Framing
The actors within the protest-repression nexus exist
in a dynamic, entangled state. To engage these
factors through the under-explored eyes of Peace
Teams attached to (but distinct from) standard social
movements in demonstrations, we adopt a sociomaterial
perspective. This perspective holds that humans and
technology are constantly intertwined in work [36, 37],
constituting a collective assemblage of entities to form
a whole [38, 7]. We believe that the protest-repression
nexus is a sociomaterial assemblage within which Peace
Teams are embroiled, and we therefore view their
actions as ’intra-actions,’ or actions that emerge from
their place within the assemblage [36, 8]. This is
particularly intuitive for de-escalatory tactics, which
operate along the lines of relations from Peace Teams to
different social actors in the assemblage. Furthermore,
the assemblage can be viewed dynamically, as
encounters between social and technical actors change
over time in a continuous feedback loop [39], allowing
us to understand intra-actions in light of previous
encounters.
Tarafdar and Kajal Ray [8] theorize social protest
cycles as the “micro-foundation” of social movements.
The social protest demonstration can be considered
a ’micro-micro-foundation’ in a similar fashion,
continuing the trend towards finer-grained analyses of
social movements. We first set out to depict the
sociomaterial assemblage and de-escalatory intra-active
tactics used by Peace Teams in our research question:
What is the shape of the sociomaterial assemblage
that underlies intra-active de-escalation tactics as
deployed by Peace Teams? By answering this
question, we seek to contribute theoretical insights to
sociomateriality through a perspective of Peace Teams
in the protest-repression nexus.
3. Methods
To answer these questions, we conducted
semi-structured interviews and focus groups with
nonviolence workers and intellectual leaders. We
recruited participants through engagement with
a network of Peace Teams and peace activists,
with assistance from Pace e Bene Nonviolence
Service, an independent, non-denominational,
non-profit organization that promotes nonviolent
approaches to social action. To focus on violence
intervention experience at demonstrations, we
prioritized organizations that have worked these
events, which resulted in participation from DC Peace
Team (Washington DC) (4), Portland Peace Team
(Portland, OR) (4), and Meta Peace Team (Michigan)
(only 1 member responded to the invitation). We also
included other participants who could contribute their
personal experiences in demonstrations (an additional 8
participants).
We conducted 2 focus group and 6 individual
interviews (17 total participants) via Zoom from March
to May of 2021. Each individual or focus group
interview took between 1 and 2.5 hours. Participant
ages ranged from the ”25 to 34 year-old” bracket
all the way to ”above 65 years old”. We asked
questions pertaining to personal and organizational
experiences managing and mitigating violent repression
during demonstrations, as well as the use of various
technologies and tools in supporting tactics1. In
semi-structured manner, we also explored emergent
topics.
We then used qualitative, reflexive thematic analysis
[40, 41] stipulating familiarization, code generation, and
theme construction. The process of theme construction
is ”akin to processes of engineering or design” built
from meaningful patterns of codes [41], and so we
gleaned insights from the constructive process across the
interview and focus group transcripts. We conducted
our qualitative coding using QDA Miner Lite. We
approached the analysis inductively without a priori
themes, but were sensitized to the relationships between
actors and tools. We also adopted idealist ontological
and constructionist epistemological stances, which
emphasizes the social embeddedness of experiences
[40] and allowed for a deeper reading behind participant
experiences.




Our research question asked What is the shape of
the sociomaterial assemblage that underlies intra-active
de-escalation tactics as deployed by Peace Teams? Here
we explore that topic in terms of team structure, the
various network of actors around Peace Teams, and their
tools and de-escalatory tactics.
4.1. Experiences with Violent Repression
Peace Teams characterize the body of de-escalatory
tactics as direct responses to forms of violent repression.
When asked to describe their experiences with violent
repression, participants spoke of physical violence
such as physical attacks by state authorities through
munitions, chemical irritants, physical striking, and
‘picking,’ where police select a seemingly arbitrary
person from a group of people and seize them, a process
that takes place in full view of other demonstrators.
They also reported police also use repressive forms of
spatial control, most notably ‘kettling,’ where police
create a confined space where entry and exit is strictly
controlled.
Participants also described counter-protesters and
demonstrators themselves as sources of violence.
Counter-protesters would threaten physical violence,
which can be particularly frightening in states with
open-carry laws 2. Counter-protesters also would
conduct verbal attacks, such as de-humanizing
slurs directed at demonstrators. Thus, participants
conceptualized ‘violence’ as not just harms to the body,
but also to psychological harms.
Demonstrators too can participate in violent acts,
particularly in response to police or counter-protesters.
Peace Teams in these cases intervene to help activists
maintain their nonviolent discipline, which bolsters
a movement’s overall efficacy [3]. While direct
intervention work can be dangerous at times, members
are trained to preserve their own safety.
4.2. Deployment Relationships and Structure
Peace Team members described trying to build
relationships with demonstration organizers during the
lead-up phases. This involves sitting in on meetings,
learning the role they are to play, and establishing norms
of expectation, a process participants considered to be
building necessary trust. Peace Teams may withdraw
from an event if their norms do not match, i.e. where
violent methods are accepted or they are to act as
informants for police. Here, failure to establish trust
2‘Open Carry’ in the United States is the open display of a live
firearm.
that organizations share views on means and ends could
block Peace Team participation.
A critical distinction between different Peace Teams
is whether they will attend a demonstration without an
explicit invitation from a social movement organization.
For instance, Portland Peace Team was sidelined
throughout most of 2020 due to lack of invitation despite
the increased racial justice demonstration activity
following the murder of George Floyd. This, they
reported, was a result of the adoption of violent tactics
by the social movement organizations that rose to
prominence at the time, which disagreed with the
nonviolent ethos of the Peace Team. When trust in a
shared set of means cannot be established, Peace Teams
can be sidelined.
Although different Peace Teams will display distinct
structures during deployment, it is nonetheless helpful
to depict a key case that illustrates a typical structure.
The DC Peace Team, as an example, deploys a
combination of on-the-ground teams integrated directly
into the demonstration with coordination provided
by remote-support personnel that monitor information
sources through social media for situational awareness.
On-the-ground teams are composed of smaller units
fulfilling interconnected roles: frontline members
dispersed throughout groups of demonstrators on
ground level; a scouting, supporting member that
moves along the periphery of those demonstrators
(colloquially called “Care Bears”); and emergency
drivers that can quickly ferry away a targeted individual
to safety (“extraction”). Frontline members provide
direct de-escalation, rotating between Care Bear and
frontline roles as needed, and can arrange for the
extraction of a person targeted for violent repression
to an awaiting emergency driver. On-the-ground team
leaders coordinate with members of their on-the-ground
team, other team leaders, and remote support team
members.
Remote support team members are distanced from
the demonstration (e.g. one member lives in Scotland),
monitoring the media and information ecosystem before
and during an event. This entails constant monitoring
of various Twitter accounts that they identified in the
lead-up to a demonstration, and using TweetDeck 3
for real-time consumption and analysis. They track
live streams and tweets from journalists and activists,
filtering actionable information to on-the-ground team
leaders. This information can include the movement
of police and counter-protesters near Peace Teams or
demonstrators, or other potential sources of escalation.
Eli McCarthy, with the DC Peace Team, described the
3TweetDeck is a Twitter visualization platform for viewing
multiple accounts side-by-side.
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role this information plays in situational awareness and
providing early warnings of violence:
[. . . ] we would get messages from the
remote team, like, “there’s 100 proud boys
at 15th and K marching north”. And we
could then figure out based on where we
were, usually around Black Lives Matter
Plaza, you know, should we send people
in that direction. [...] So we use that
information in real time to then develop
responses and maybe communicate that
with other people on the ground.
Although not all teams currently use remote support
(e.g. Portland Peace Team), participants did express
interest in adopting these methods in the future.
4.3. De-escalation Tactics
Paralleling basic concepts of unarmed civilian
peacekeeping identified by Julian and Schweitzer [12],
we dimensionalize the reported de-escalation tactics
during demonstrations as a) communication tactics; b)
physical tactics; and c) spatial management tactics.
Although distinct Peace Teams will differ in which
tactics they use, these reported tactics largely compose
the space of available options available to teams. Here
we present them in turn.
As unarmed peacekeepers, the most relied upon tools
for de-escalation center on communicative practices,
most notably the use of the CLARA method [42].
Sal Corbin, a member of the DC Peace Team,
described communication tactics as a re-direction of
energy, to ”siphon off that energy into something that’s
non-related.” Alejandra Moreno, a member of Portland
Peace described a cellphone as a useful centerpiece of
de-escalation:
[...] phones are great [as a distraction
method] [...] if someone’s talking about
something very passionately you can
distract them by like, searching for
something on your phone, or [...] taking
a picture of a group [...] like, ”oh you’re
all together and you might wanna take a
[photo]?” [...] and by that point, everyone
else is gone.
Similar distraction tactics include using unrelated
queries like asking for directions or commenting on
materials in the immediate vicinity like help with a
cellphone or someone’s clothes.
Team members also reported using reminders of
humanity (re-humanizing) as a verbal de-escalatory
tactic by holding themselves out to an escalating person
as someone who is willing to listen and appreciate
their perspective, even if they may not agree with it
ideologically. This is an emotionally challenging tactic,
and members reported that it requires putting aside one’s
own personal ideologies in service to de-escalation. This
was also one of the few tactics that participants reported
using to de-escalate police in a direct manner by
reminding them of their place in a broader community.
A leader of the Portland Peace Team, Dr. Tom Hastings
recounted pre-emptively de-escalating police during the
Occupy Portland demonstrations:
[. . . ] there were cops, some on horseback,
cops in complete riot gear, ready to go [. . . ]
and I had a conversation at every single one
of their units before I [. . . ] went back home
and my conversation was basically ”Look,
you know, you guys, you really in terms
of public relations, you have managed to
be at least equal with Occupy because you
restrained yourselves. I’m very worried that
somebody is going to get hurt tonight. And
if you hurt somebody tonight, you’re going
to lose. You will lose and you will be in bad
shape in terms of publicity in how Portland
looks at you. So I’m asking you, please
don’t hurt anybody tonight.”
He noted that the application of this type of tactic
might be a distinctive feature of the Portland locality,
being a comparatively tight-knit community compared
to many other Peace Teams’ regions, such as the DC
Peace Team. By comparison, one DC Peace Team
member intimated that, while they have a host of tactics
that they use for counter-protesters and demonstrators,
they feel much less confident de-escalating the police.
Further complicating relationships with police
is that direct communication with officers during
demonstrations can negatively affect how demonstrators
view Peace Teams, and compromise the trust that Teams
build with demonstrators. There was broad consensus
across participants that being linked to police can have a
profound negative impact on trust with social movement
organizations and demonstrators. There appears to be
a symbolic value of de-escalation, and that none of
these tactics take place isolated from other actors in the
protest-repression nexus. When Peace Teams engage
with certain actors, trust with others in their network can
become compromised.
In addition to the communication tactics at
Peace Team disposal is an array of direct physical
intervention tactics. Commonly used in conjunction
with communication, physical intervention focuses on
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bodies, either the use of the team member’s body or
in extracting targeted persons in order to de-escalate
a situation. In the case of the former, Peace Team
members reported physically interjecting themselves
between belligerents (“interpositioning”), adding an
additional layer of humanity they would need to
penetrate before physical violence could occur.
A slightly less direct form of physical intervention
is accompaniment and extraction, where a team member
escorts a consenting and targeted individual away from
a potentially escalatory situation. This could be away
from police or counter-protesters, ideally ending in a
safe location or in a safe vehicle of a team member who
will transport them to safety.
The least direct form of de-escalatory tactics used
in demonstrations that participants reported is the
management of space, using notions of proximity
or separation to influence a particular environment.
This can involve visual displays of moral authority,
separation of spaces occupied by potential sources of
escalation, and the setting up of de-escalatory spaces.
The use of moral authority promotes a nonviolent
environment based on proximity. Peace Teams could
do this directly through the use of clearly marked
identification of members, such as a light blue vest, that
communicates a peace-making presence. Selecting clear
visual identifiers needed to cohere with the local context,
as one team member active in Minneapolis reported
that the decision to use orange as a vest color proved
problematic as it was the same color used by hunters
in that region. Teams could also rely on prominent
figures of moral authority, and cited their gravity to
similar effect. For instance, religious leaders based
on previously established community significance, or
hereditary chiefs in movements with a matching social
and cultural context (i.e. Indigenous-lead movements)
could serve in this role.
In some cases, the best way to de-escalate a situation
and prevent violent repression is to physically separate
demonstrators from potential sources of repression.
One participant described the prevention of direct
conflict between demonstrators and counter-protesters
through the strategic placement of police barricades.
Within the teams, remote support personnel provided
situational awareness that allowed Peace Teams to
inform organizers about potential escalatory parties.
Participants also described the creation of
de-escalatory spaces. These could be spaces of healing,
like aid stations and healing circles, that communicate a
nonviolent presence. One Portland Peace Team member
described aid stations within a local church which
provided a respite point during potentially intense
demonstrations throughout the day. Art installations
likewise communicate a nonviolent presence through
artistic expression. In these cases, the establishment
of spaces with a clear nonviolent orientation works to
produce a de-escalated environment.
4.4. Tools and Technologies of De-escalation
Although particular tools could differ between
organizations (e.g. Portland Peace Team does not
make use of remote support teams), we identified the
available tools (and surrounding sentiments) as reported
by Peace Team participants. As organizations composed
of volunteers with varying tech capacities, ease of
use and accessibility were essential considerations in
tool selection. Device security, too, is paramount to
ensuring volunteers are not putting demonstrators (or
themselves) at risk of further repression from state
authorities. Peace Teams did not depend on just
digital technologies to support or enable tactics, but
rather fit those technologies within their tactical and
organizational structures, maintaining a stable of digital,
analog, and human-to-human tools.
Teams coordinate and share critical information
to support de-escalation through point-to-point
communication via encrypted message services.
Peace Team members most commonly reported using
the encrypted SMS service Signal, and to a lesser
extent WhatsApp. Although these tools can support
situational awareness, they are just one communication
tool among several others, including hand signals and
walkie-talkies.
For coordination and supporting spatial
management tactics, Peace Team participants reported
communicating to larger groups of people through
broadcast tools such as microphones or megaphones.
They also use broadcasting to communicate the norms
and expectations for a demonstration.
Social media monitoring plays a role in
situational awareness to support all tactics through
the remote support teams. One remote support
member described a TweetDeck display tailored
to a particular demonstration, through which they
gather information from trustworthy journalists, social
movement organizations, and activists live-tweeting or
live-streaming from the ground. Actionable information
then follows the coordination channels via Signal,
typically sent to on-the-ground team leaders who can
respond accordingly.
Smartphones are multi-purpose, as in addition to
providing access to the communication channels, they
also support some useful apps like the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) app to record and report
police misconduct. However, participants approached
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these devices with skepticism. Recounting stories
of police seizing devices and breaking into them to
harvest information on activists, members are cautious
about smartphone use in demonstration. Through their
alignment with demonstrators and social movement
organizations, their networks of contacts commonly
include individuals that state authorities are interested
in. Furthermore, Peace Team members were also
aware of how state authorities can track devices
within a broad surveillance apparatus that renders
smartphone use risky. So despite the potential for more
advanced technological support through these devices
(e.g. multiple participants discussed the possibility
of maps in supporting geospatial awareness), concerns
about device security under state surveillance apparatus
limits these possibilities. How technologies could be
used against activist allies of Peace Teams spurs mistrust
of more advanced tools.
5. Discussion
We yield theoretical insights by a) casting
de-escalatory tactics as a confluence of social and
material intra-actions, and b) exploring bases of trust as
mechanisms of the assemblage’s configuration.
5.1. De-escalatory Tactics as a Confluence of
Social and Material Intra-actions
The simple model of de-escalation is that it involves
a pair of social actors, primarily a de-escalator, such
as a member of the Peace Team, and a de-escalatee,
such as a counter-protester or demonstrator. Although in
the case of spatial management tactics where the effect
is diffused across a few different actors, for instance
a moral authority’s presence producing a de-escalatory
space, it can still be considered a paired interaction
between an individual and a group.
However, a sociomaterial perspective of these
tactics illuminates that de-escalatory tactics are not
intra-actions composed of subject-object social dyads,
but rather as a confluence of social and material
intra-actions. While the tactics give the appearance of
a local resolution to a localized violence potential [6],
the tactics rest on underlying intra-actions between the
social and material. Physical and verbal de-escalatory
tactics emerge through the direct efforts of social agents
with coordination through communication tools, such
as messaging apps and walkie-talkies. At distance,
remote support teams draw information from social
media to coordinate teams’ responses to the location
of escalatory elements, highlighting social media’s
material presence [8]. In some cases, the literal
materiality of a tool formed the core of the tactic, such as
using the smartphone as the centerpiece of a distracting
conversation with an escalated person.
Spatial tactics by their nature engage the qualities
of the material environment, depending on use
of proximity and separation to create spaces with
de-escalatory potential. Tactics that leverage proximity
or the separation of space represent a configuration of
the material environment for de-escalation. Although
spatial tactics are organized among social actors,
the material environment are intra-active agents in
de-escalation. Space and presence as known in
peacekeeping [12] can therefore be considered a
confluence of social and material intra-action, the latter
being at the very least environmentally-based.
In such assemblages, boundaries between
components are fluid, determined within phenomena
[6]. Interestingly, the fluidity, or at least permeability,
of these bounds in the protest-repression nexus can
be observed through the eyes of the Peace Team:
de-escalatory tools and tactics do not take place in a
socio-material bubble. Rather, use of certain tactics
or tools with certain entities could compromise the
capacity to deploy de-escalatory tactics elsewhere, for
example how interactions with police or cellphone
recording could negatively impact relations with
demonstrators.
This observation leads us to a theoretical insight
starting with a question: what is the underlying
mechanism that governs how lines of relationship
between entities, along which de-escalatory tactics
emerge, can be cut off due to the use of other
tactics elsewhere in the assemblage? Under a
sociomaterial perspective, this mechanism provides an
explanation of the assemblage’s dynamism that informs
decision-making by Peace Teams. In the next section,
we argue for bases of trust as this mechanism.
5.2. Bases of Trust in the Assemblage
Notions of trust permeated respondents’ discussions,
causing us to reflect on how this substantial phenomenon
affects the shape and form of the sociomaterial
assemblage. On the one hand, interactions with police
can only go so far as they do not communicate a
misalignment of shared values with social movements.
When there is a perception that values are no longer
shared, organizations can halt the relationship with
Peace Teams altogether, or vice versa. On the other
hand, relationships with tools are also depended on trust.
A smartphone, for all its capacity to store and record
information, expresses its power differently depending
upon the embedding phenomenon. In the hands of
a Peace Team member, it is a force of de-escalation,
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coordination, and peace. When seized by the state, it
is a force of surveillance and oppressive control.
Viewing this space as a sociomaterial assemblage,
distinctions between the social and material is fluid
and determined within phenomena. What we consider
intentions, values, and expectations have parallel
expressions across both social and material actors. This
parallel, we argue, stems from the local enactment of
trust within these phenomena. In particular, it is an
enactment of the bases of trust. Earle and Siegrist’s
[43] conception of trust builds from a basis in morally
relevant information. It is through an assessment of
similar intentions, values, and expectations about the
future [43, 44] that trust is based. Socially, the decision
to engage with police enacts a particular set of values,
expectations and intentions. Trust breaks down when
demonstrators view these bases as misaligned with their
own. Peace Teams predict this, and choose to limit
interactions with state authorities (or at least navigate
them carefully). Materially, advanced tools are viewed
with only limited trust as they can become tools of
oppression when co-opted by entities misaligned with
the Peace Teams’ values. There is therefore a parallel
caution between social and material entities that is the
result of a predicted possible expression of misaligned
values.
PytlikZillig and Kimbrough’s [45] analysis of trust
literature showed that multiple scholars speak to
the vulnerability of the trustor [46] and a positive
expectation of the trustee [47] that together make
trust meaningful. Police mistreatment of activists
discourages vulnerability, and Peace Teams can in
turn become sources of added vulnerability for social
movements, for instance in engaging with police.
Technologies too can become sources of vulnerability
in a similar fashion as they hold substantial information
not just about Peace Teams, but activists as well. And
so when positive expectations are violated (e.g. police
misconduct or Peace Teams passing information to
police), lines of trust (be they social or material) become
sources of vulnerability.
Thus, entities enact different values in different
phenomena, and perceived misalignment leads to
mistrust. Furthermore, trust in social and material actors
hinges upon their potential as sources of vulnerability
through their connection or exploitation by other
mistrusted entities in the assemblage. Enactment
is not in isolation from other enactments, and
perceived values misalignment combined with possibly
exploitation of vulnerable entities breaks down lines
of relationship between social and material actors, and
in turn, the potential for de-escalatory intra-actions.
Participant emphasis on trust stems from its critical
role in producing this dynamism in the sociomaterial
assemblage.
5.3. Contributions to Scholarship and Practice
Scholarship shows that maintaining nonviolent
discipline supports the overall efficacy of social
movements [3] and thus supports progress in liberal
democracies. Peace Teams as de-escalatory forces
are therefore potent in a healthy, evolving democracy.
This study continues Julian’s tactical dimensions of
Peace Teams [16, 14] by adding empirical depth and
dimensions of tactics, depicting its manifestation in
contemporary demonstration and the entanglement of
dimensions in practice.
Furthermore, viewing Peace Team work through
the sociomaterial lens garnered theoretical insights
for sociomaterial scholars. First, we argued that
de-escalatory tactics as intra-action constitute a
confluence of intra-activity, whereby tactics emerge
from social and material entities in relation to one
another. This provides empirical grounding to Barad’s
[6] sociomaterial scholarship within a novel domain.
We then import scholarship on trust [43, 44, 45, 47, 46],
and extending trust research in peace to sociomateriality
in demonstration [11], arguing from a sociomaterial
perspective its role in shaping the configuration of the
sociomaterial assemblage in parallel ways between
social and material actors.
For Peace Teams, there is benefit to regarding
their relationship with social and material entities
in parallel ways, particularly with regards to trust.
Intra-actions with the social (e.g. police) and material
(e.g. smartphones) display parallel trust implications
based on the observation that no intra-action takes
place in a bubble. At the same time, tactics as a
confluence of intra-actions suggests that maximizing
trusting relations with the social and material maximizes
de-escalatory capacity. However, these connections are
often in tension. First, communicating with certain
entities like police in de-escalation can have a negative
impact on trust with social movements. Second,
advanced technologies can have greater potential to
support de-escalation, but also introduce higher risk
to social movements and Peace Teams themselves.
While social movement research focuses largely on
digital technologies like social media [8], there is
space for lower technology solutions like walkie-talkies.
Therefore, a critical component of de-escalatory work
is the inherent risk management that must be involved
in decision-making processes around tactics and tools,
and remaining flexible thinkers with regards to tool
selection.
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6. Limitations and Future Directions
This analysis could benefit from additional
contribution from more Peace Teams and more overall
participants (although the sample’s expert perspectives
mitigated the smaller numbers). Additionally,
triangulation from additional data sets like observation
of protests or team practices would also be beneficial,
but is outside the scope of this particular study. We
intend for future research to connect more participants
and new data sets with these findings.
Further, while we focused on tactics and tools, there
is value to exploring and problematizing non-violent
interventions with a lens on power dynamics and
positions of privilege. Trust also emerged from our
findings as a critical mechanism, and further research
should explore with more theoretical depth its impact on
the socio-material assemblage. Due to size constraints,
we could not explore these topics adequately, but will
seek to extend to do so as the research progresses.
7. Conclusion
With nonviolent discipline a critical aspect of
effective social movements and in turn a healthy
democracy [3], Peace Teams can maximize social
movement efficacy through their de-escalatory tactics.
In this article, we set out to analyze Peace Teams
through a sociomaterial lens, casting these tactics as
intra-action within the protest-repression nexus, itself
a sociomaterial assemblage. Through semi-structured
interviews and focus groups, we dimensionalized
current Peace Team tactics across the communicative,
physical, and spatial. In identifying the variety of
tools that underlie these tactics from coordination,
situational awareness, and even direct materiality (e.g.
cellphones as distracting and features of the material
environment), we identified de-escalatory tactics as a
confluence of intra-action between social and material
actors. This lead us to a theoretical insight about
the bases of trust as an underlying mechanism for
understanding the dynamic nature of intra-actions in
the protest-repression assemblage. While bases of
trust underlie social connections, they also influence
material ones, as tools like IT artifacts can be co-opted
by mistrusted groups and in turn compromise trusted
connections to other social entities, thus shaping
the assemblage. Our work extends scholarship on
the sociomateriality of protest to Peace Teams as a
distinctive organization active with (but distinct from)
social movement organizations [36, 8], bridging to trust
scholarship [43, 44, 11], and extending understanding
of unarmed civilian peacekeeping tactics [16, 14].
For practitioners, this view highlights the need to
remain flexible thinkers with regards to tools and their
materiality given the interconnectedness of actors within
the protest-repression nexus.
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